![]() ![]() Using proxy war as a means of indirect intervention requires considering both the policy’s utility-a short-term view that determines whether a proxy can actually provide the ability to intervene-and the efficacy-a long-term view that evaluates the likelihood that supporting the chosen proxy can produce a desirable outcome. Both provide a middle ground for intervention and help bypass the thresholds for direct intervention and nonintervention. I define proxy war as directing the use of force by a politically motivated, local actor to indirectly influence political affairs in the target state. I define donating assistance as providing resources, without intending to direct the actions of a local actor, to influence political affairs in the target state. To avoid adding to the confusion about different methods of indirect intervention, I find it necessary to separate the action into two distinct categories: donating assistance and proxy war (concepts I explore in detail in Chapter 2). Indirect intervention, and more specifically proxy war, demands more rigorous exploration and study to remedy misperceptions and misunderstanding of its use as a tool of foreign policy. The usefulness of proxy war has unfortunately been overblown. This Cold War image of proxy war continues to dominate the contemporary view of indirect interventions that involve a third party to influence civil affairs abroad and helps explain its continued use (and misuse) as an instrument of foreign policy. Local actors and conflicts were hijacked to serve the interests of Washington and Moscow. Small states on the periphery were often viewed as pawns in a much greater game, allowing the United States and the Soviet Union to compete globally without risking nuclear war. During the Cold War, the use of proxies allowed states to be far more adventurous in their efforts to influence world events and gain an advantage over their rivals. The term proxy war carries a lot of baggage. This kind of scenario is where proxy war makes its entrance into the field of possible policy options. If such a prospect appears even remotely feasible, then the question “Why fight when someone else will do it for us?” will more than likely become a dominant part of the conversation. To make such a prospect even more tempting, consider keeping the policy covert and making the involvement deniable. Under such circumstances, it may seem alluring to seize an opportunity to outsource the personnel needed for a foreign military intervention. When “doing nothing” is not perceived as an option, yet direct intervention appears to be a step too far, decision makers and their staffs seek ways to intervene indirectly. This book is about understanding the “something in between” policy. If the situation influences national security, but the circumstances do not so strongly engender public support for an overt commitment, then the decision maker has a more difficult choice to make: (1) choose not to intervene and suffer the consequences of political adversaries at home and rival states abroad viewing the administration as weak on security and unwilling to stand up to threats abroad (2) choose to intervene directly and risk failure or being labeled as aggressive and unconcerned about the ensuing loss of life or (3) find something in between. ![]() Such circumstances allow the decision maker to quickly move to planning for a direct intervention. If a civil war breaks out in another state and overtly threatens your own state’s security, then the situation clearly warrants a direct and overt response. All players here are going to have to pay a penalty and the United States of America is going to be on the side of people who fight for freedom.” 1 But the threat in Syria just doesn’t look threatening enough to the White House, or most American citizens, to warrant a direct intervention. We’re going to have the Russians pay a price for their engagement. We’re going to dedicate ourselves to the removal of Bashar al-Assad. McCain publicly urged the president, “I want to hear him say we’re going to arm the free Syrian army. Senator John McCain consistently pushed the White House to arm Syrian rebels as a means to bring down the Assad regime without committing America’s regular forces. ![]() WHEN THE decision to intervene in another state’s affairs becomes a public conversation, a decision maker can be left with only deciding how, rather than whether, to intervene. ![]()
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